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Research provides important evidences about the role of emotions in a wide range of judgments,
includingmoral decisions (Haidt, 2003; Teper et al., 2015). Recent findings show that real compared
to hypothetical moral decisions brings about higher physiological activity (Teper et al., 2011). In
agreement, studies on the autonomic correlates of deception reported: (i) higher skin conductance
(Coricelli et al., 2010); (ii) increased pupil dilation (Hochman et al., 2016); (iii) higher regulation of
sympathetic activity before lying for a self-gain when reputation is at risk (Panasiti et al., 2016).
However, there is little evidence regarding the influence of discrete emotions on dishonesty.
Notably, exceptions are the few studies reporting that inducing envy (Moran and Schweitzer, 2005;
Gino and Pierce, 2009) or anxiety (Kouchaki and Desai, 2015) enhances deception, while inducing
anger or fear oppositely influences hypothetical ethical decisions (Kligyte et al., 2013).
In their recent paper, Motro et al. (2016) made considerable advances in the literature, by
reporting that induction of anger and guilt enhances and decreases deception, respectively.
Crucially, they also report that the influence of these emotions on deception is mediated by the
increment of impulsive thinking in the case of anger and by the enhancement of deliberate thinking
in the case of guilt. In this commentary, we propose an additional explanation of their findings that
aims at connecting the authors’ results with those of other important studies about deception.
On the one hand, Motro’s results nicely fit with studies showing that guilt induction reduces
cheating when experiencing physical weights (Kouchaki et al., 2014) and that anger promotes
deception by reducing empathy and enhancing self-interest (Yip and Schweitzer, 2016). Also
developmental research shows that in 4- and 8-years old children, anger enhances immoral
(aggressive) behavior, and that this increment is mitigated by children’s ability to anticipate guilt
(Colasante et al., 2016).
Moreover, the mediation of deliberate vs impulsive thinking supports the Theory of “Deliberate
Honesty” according to which, when deception is tempting, dishonesty is the immediate choice
while honesty would require reflection (Bereby-Meyer and Shalvi, 2015).
On the other hand, recent theories posit that any choice could be impulsive or deliberate
depending on the value-based computation between alternatives (Berkman et al., 2016).
Accordingly, the Self-Concept Maintenance Hypothesis (Mazar et al., 2008) proposes that deciding
whether to deceive involves a conflict between the temptation to dishonestly achieve some benefit
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(extrinsic goal) and the desire to act according to internalized
social norms (intrinsic goal). This conflict is modulated by
several variables: dishonesty is enhanced by anonymity (Zhong
et al., 2010), time-pressure (Shalvi et al., 2012), monetary
priming (Gino and Mogilner, 2014), sense of entitlement (Poon
et al., 2013; Schurr and Ritov, 2016), and positive self-concept
activation (Khan and Dhar, 2006; Brown et al., 2011); conversely,
honesty is enhanced by reading statements that endorse free-
will (Vohs and Schooler, 2008), the Ten Commandments (Mazar
et al., 2008), a code of honor (Shu et al., 2011), or by the need to
safeguard one’s own reputation (Panasiti et al., 2011, 2014, 2016).
Here, we propose that anger and guilt might have enhanced
the salience of extrinsic (money) vs. intrinsic (honesty) goals,
respectively. Anger is triggered when the achievement of one’s
important extrinsic goal is prevented by somebody or something
(Lazarus and Lazarus, 1994; Turner, 2007), or when someone else
behaves unfairly (i.e., in a way that prevents others to reach their
extrinsic goal; Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). Differently, guilt
is evoked by the awareness that we did not act morally (Sheikh
and Janoff-Bulman, 2010) and thus that we did not accomplish
an intrinsic goal. These links are supported by findings showing
that: (i) anger facilitates attention (He et al., 2013) and gaze-
imitation (Terburg et al., 2012) toward rewarding cues and it
is associated with reward-related electrocortical activity (Angus
et al., 2015); (ii) baseline activity of the insula and guilt aversion
promote the achievement of intrinsic social goals (Chang et al.,
2011; Baumgartner et al., 2013).
This alternative explanation aims at reconciling the seeming
inconsistency between Motro’s results and the studies that show
how deliberation and impulsivity are not necessary linked to
honesty and dishonesty, respectively. It has been showed for
example that inducing a deliberate vs. intuitive mindset increases
deception (Zhong, 2011) and that honesty is the default choice
for most people (Xu and Ma, 2015).
Moreover, Machiavellians and psychopaths who are
strategically dishonest and show low sense of guilt, constitute
perfect examples of why deliberation (i) is not always triggered
by guilt and (ii) is not necessarily associated to honesty. In
particular, Machiavellian people feel low sense of guilt for
lying (Gozna et al., 2001); have no need to down-regulate
their autonomic system before lying (Panasiti et al., 2016), and
show no cortical motor inhibition nor reputation effects for
lying (Panasiti et al., 2011, 2014). They are also highly strategic
(Jones and Paulhus, 2012) and this bring them to a great deal of
deception during their everyday life (Kashy and DePaulo, 1996).
Similarly, psychopaths are more likely to perform premeditated
(deliberate) than impulsive crimes (Swogger et al., 2010), and
show a weaker modulation of anticipated guilt in anterior insula
(Seara-Cardoso et al., 2016).
Here, we suggest that despite a change in goals’ salience might
in turn cause a change in the propensity of using deliberate
vs. impulsive thinking, style of thinking alone might not be
sufficient to modulate participants’ ethical behavior. Differently,
the crucial modulation might lie in the change of goals’ salience
itself. This interpretation would explain why (i) manipulative and
psychopathic people who are more attracted to extrinsic than
intrinsic goals (Mchoskey, 1999) engage in deliberate thinking
and yet behave dishonestly; (ii) inducing an impulsive setting
without priming extrinsic goals enhances honesty (Zhong, 2011);
(iii) honesty becomes the default choice as participants’ moral
identity increases (Xu and Ma, 2015).
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
MSP and GP have made substantial, direct, and intellectual
contribution to the work, and approved it for publication.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are grateful to Prof. Salvatore Maria Aglioti for his
comments.
REFERENCES
Angus, D. J., Kemkes, K., Schutter, D. J., and Harmon-Jones, E. (2015). Anger
is associated with reward-related electrocortical activity: evidence from the
reward positivity. Psychophysiology 52, 1271–1280. doi: 10.1111/psyp.12460
Baumgartner, T., Gianotti, L. R., and Knoch, D. (2013). Who is honest
and why : baseline activation in anterior insula predicts inter-
individual differences in deceptive behavior. Biol. Psychol. 94, 192–197.
doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2013.05.018
Bereby-Meyer, Y., and Shalvi, S. (2015). Deliberate honesty. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 6,
195–198. doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.004
Berkman, E., Hutcherson, C., Livingston, J. L., Kahn, L. E., and Inzlicht, M. (2016).
Self-Control as Value-Based Choice. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2665823. Available online
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2665823
Brown, R. P., Tamborski, M., Wang, X., Barnes, C. D., Mumford, M. D., Connelly,
S., et al. (2011). Moral credentialing and the rationalization of misconduct.
Ethics Behav. 21, 1–12. doi: 10.1080/10508422.2011.537566
Chang, L. J., Smith, A., Dufwenberg, M., and Sanfey, A. G. (2011). Article
triangulating the neural, psychological, and economic bases of guilt aversion.
Neuron 70, 560–572. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.02.056
Colasante, T., Zuffianò, A., and Malti, T. (2016). Daily deviations in anger, guilt,
and sympathy: a developmental diary study of aggression. J. Abnorm. Child
Psychol. 44, 1515–1526. doi: 10.1007/s10802-016-0143-y
Coricelli, G., Joffily, M., Montmarquette, C., and Villeval, M. C. (2010). Cheating,
emotions, and rationality : an experiment on tax evasion. Exp. Econ. 13,
226–247. doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9237-5
Gino, F., and Mogilner, C. (2014). Time, money, and morality. Psychol. Sci. 25,
414–421. doi: 10.1177/0956797613506438
Gino, F., and Pierce, L. (2009). Dishonesty in the name of equity. Psychol.
Sci. J. Am. Psychol. Soc. 20, 1153–1160. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.0
2421.x
Gozna, L., Vrij, A., and Bull, R. (2001). The impact of individual differences on
perceptions of lying in everyday life and in a high stake situation. Pers. Individ.
Dif. 31, 1203–1216. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00219-1
Haidt, J. (2003). “The moral emotions,” in Handbook of Affective Sciences, eds R.
J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, and H. H. Goldsmith (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), 852–870.
He, J., Jin, X., Zhang, M., Huang, X., Shui, R., and Shen, M. (2013). Anger and
selective attention to reward and punishment in children. J. Exp. Child Psychol.
115, 389–404. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2013.03.004
Hochman, G., Glöckner, A., Fiedler, S., and Ayal, S. (2016). “I can see it in your
eyes”: biased processing and increased arousal in dishonest responses. J. Behav.
Decis. Mak. 29, 322–335. doi: 10.1002/bdm.1932
Jones, D. N., and Paulhus, D. L. (2012). “Differentiating the dark triad within
the interpersonal circumplex,” in Handbook of Interpersonal Psychology:
Theory, Research, Assessment, and Therapeutic Interventions, eds L. M.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 159
Panasiti and Ponsi Commentary: Emotions and Deception
Horowitz and S. Strack (New York, NY: Wiley & Sons), 249–267.
doi: 10.1002/9781118001868.ch15
Kashy, D. A., and DePaulo, B. M. (1996). Who lies? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 70,
1037–1051. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.1037
Khan, U., and Dhar, R. (2006). Licensing effect in consumer choice. J. Mark. Res.
43, 259–266. doi: 10.1509/jmkr.43.2.259
Kligyte, V., Connelly, S., Thiel, C., and Devenport, L. (2013). The Influence of
anger, fear, and emotion regulation on ethical decision making. Hum. Perform.
26, 297–326. doi: 10.1080/08959285.2013.814655
Kouchaki, M., and Desai, S. D. (2015). Anxious, threatened, and also unethical :
how anxiety makes individuals feel threatened and commit unethical acts. J.
Appl. Psychol. 100, 360–375. doi: 10.1037/a0037796
Kouchaki, M., Gino, F., and Jami, A. (2014). The burden of guilt: heavy backpacks,
light snacks, and enhanced morality. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 143, 414–424.
doi: 10.1037/a0031769
Lazarus, R. S., and Lazarus, B. N. (1994). Passion and Reason: Making Sense of our
Emotions. New York, NY; Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc.
Mazar, N., Amir, O., and Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest
people: a theory of self-concept maintenance. J. Mark. Res. 45, 633–644.
doi: 10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633
Mchoskey, J. W. (1999). Machiavellianism, intrinsic versus extrinsic goals, and
social interest : a self-determination theory analysis.Motiv. Emot. 23, 267–283.
doi: 10.1023/A:1021338809469
Moran, S., and Schweitzer, M. E. (2005). When better is worse: envy and
the use of deception in negotiations. Negot. Confl. Manag. Res. 1, 3–29.
doi: 10.1111/j.1750-4716.2007.00002.x
Motro, D., Ordóñez, L. D., Pittarello, A., andWelsh, D. T. (2016). Investigating the
effects of anger and guilt on unethical behaviour: a dual-process approach. J.
Bus. Ethics 1–16. doi: 10.1007/s10551-016-3337-x
Panasiti, M. S., Cardone, D., Pavone, E. F., Mancini, A., Merla, A., and Aglioti, S.
M. (2016). Thermal signatures of voluntary deception in ecological conditions.
Sci. Rep. 6:35174. doi: 10.1038/srep35174
Panasiti, M. S., Pavone, E. F., Mancini, A., Merla, A., Grisoni, L., and Aglioti,
S. M. (2014). The motor cost of telling lies: electrocortical signatures and
personality foundations of spontaneous deception. Soc. Neurosci. 9, 573–589.
doi: 10.1080/17470919.2014.934394
Panasiti, M. S., Pavone, E. F., Merla, A., and Aglioti, S. M. (2011). Situational
and dispositional determinants of intentional deceiving. PLoS ONE 6:e19465.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0019465
Pillutla, M. M., and Murnighan, J. K. (1996). Unfairness, anger, and spite:
emotional rejections of ultimatum offers. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process.
68, 208–224. doi: 10.1006/obhd.1996.0100
Poon, K.-T., Chen, Z., and Dewall, C. N. (2013). Feeling entitled to more:
ostracism increases dishonest behavior. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 39, 1227–1239.
doi: 10.1177/0146167213493187
Schurr, A., and Ritov, I. (2016). Winning a competition predicts dishonest
behavior. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 113, 1754–1759. doi: 10.1073/pnas.15151
02113
Seara-Cardoso, A., Sebastian, C. L., McCrory, E., Foulkes, L., Buon, M., Roiser, J.
P., et al. (2016). Anticipation of guilt for everyday moral transgressions: the role
of the anterior insula and the influence of interpersonal psychopathic traits. Sci.
Rep. 6:36273. doi: 10.1038/srep36273
Shalvi, S., Eldar, O., and Bereby-Meyer, Y. (2012). Honesty requires time (and lack
of justifications). Psychol. Sci. 23, 1264–1270. doi: 10.1177/0956797612443835
Sheikh, S., and Janoff-Bulman, R. (2010). The “shoulds” and “should nots” of moral
emotions: a self-regulatory perspective on shame and guilt. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Bull. 36, 213–224. doi: 10.1177/0146167209356788
Shu, L. L., Gino, F., and Bazerman, M. H. (2011). Dishonest deed, clear conscience:
when cheating leads to moral disengagement and motivated forgetting. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Bull. 37, 330–349. doi: 10.1177/0146167211398138
Swogger, M. T., Walsh, Z., Houston, R. J., Cashman-Brown, S., and Conner, K. R.
(2010). Psychopathy and axis I psychiatric disorders among criminal offenders:
relationships to impulsive and proactive aggression. Aggress. Behav. 36, 45–53.
doi: 10.1002/ab.20330
Teper, R., Inzlicht, M., and Page-Gould, E. (2011). Are we more moral than we
think? Exploring the role of affect in moral behavior and moral forecasting.
Psychol. Sci. J. Am. Psychol. Soc. 22, 553–558. doi: 10.1177/0956797611402513
Teper, R., Zhong, C. B., and Inzlicht, M. (2015). How emotions shape moral
behavior: some answers (and questions) for the field of moral psychology. Soc.
Pers. Psychol. Compass 9, 1–14. doi: 10.1111/spc3.12154
Terburg, D., Aarts, H., Putman, P., and van Honk, J. (2012). In the eye of the
beholder: reduced threat-bias and increased gaze-imitation towards reward in
relation to trait anger. PLoS ONE 7:e31373. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0031373
Turner, M. M. (2007). Using emotion in risk communication: the anger activism
model. Public Relat. Rev. 33, 114–119. doi: 10.1016/j.pubrev.2006.11.013
Vohs, K. D., and Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will:
encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating. Psychol. Sci. 19, 49–54.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02045.x
Xu, Z. X., and Ma, H. K. (2015). Does honesty result from moral will or
moral grace? Why moral identity matters. J. Bus. Ethics 127, 371–384.
doi: 10.1007/s10551-014-2050-x
Yip, J. A., and Schweitzer, M. E. (2016). Mad and misleading: incidental
anger promotes deception. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 137, 207–217.
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2478692
Zhong, C.-B. (2011). The ethical dangers of deliberative decisionmaking.Adm. Sci.
Q. 56, 1–25. doi: 10.2189/asqu.2011.56.1.001
Zhong, C.-B., Bohns, V. K., and Gino, F. (2010). Good lamps are the best police:
darkness increases dishonesty and self-interested behavior. Psychol. Sci. 21,
311–314. doi: 10.1177/0956797609360754
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Panasiti and Ponsi. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 159
